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I. INTRODUCTION
W ith the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
[hereinafter IRCA], Congress temporarily alleviated the pressure
Pub. L. No. 99-603 (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1324a) (1986). Future references will be
made under the United States Code section.
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on undocumented workers.2 More importantly, however, the IRCA dras-
tically alters the implications of an Immigration and Naturalization
Services [hereinafter INS]3 workplace sweep by creating a consequence of
criminal sanctions4 for the employer discovered to have hired undocu-
mented aliens.5 With this new sanction power in place, the current
standard of allowing the INS to either obtain search warrants under a
civil administrative standard6 or to classify the sweep as outside consti-
2 See infra note 4 and accompanying text. Because of the amnesty provisions,
workplace sweeps have temporarily become less effective as a great many illegal aliens will
have their status adjusted pursuant to the IRCA. However, there is now greater pressure on
the employer as he faces criminal sanctions under the new Act.
' The Immigration and Naturalization Service [hereinafter INS] is the agency charged
with the regulation of immigration into the United States and the enforcement of the
applicable laws. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1986).
' Criminal punishment will result under the IRCA only where "[any person or entity
... engages in a pattern or practice of violations." 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1) (1986). Each
undocumented alien found to have been hired will subject the employer to a fine of up to
$3000 or the possibility of up to six months in jail. Id.
5 On June 1, 1987, with the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, it became a criminal offense to knowingly employ an unauthorized alien. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(a)(1) (1986). The Act also makes it illegal to "continue to employ the alien in the
United States knowing the alien is (or has become) an unauthorized alien." Id.
§ 1324a(a)(2). Further, it is illegal to hire any other individual without examining
particular documents and obtaining a signature on an employment authorization form. See
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1). The documents used for verification are of three types. Documents
establishing both employment authorization and identity include: (i) United States pass-
ports; (ii) certificate of U.S. citizenship; (iii) certification of naturalization; (iv) certain
unexpired foreign passports; and (v) certain resident alien cards. Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(B).
Documents evidencing employment authorization include: (i) a social security card; (ii)
United States birth certificate; and (iii) other documentation of employment approved by
the Attorney General. Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(C). Documents establishing identity include: (i)
driver's license or other state issued identification; and (ii) other approved means of
identification for minors. Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(D). Finally, the employer must attest under
penalty of perjury that she has verified the employee's status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(2).
"The individual must attest, under penalty of perjury... that the individual is a citizen or
national of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or an
alien who is authorized under this chapter ... to be hired ... for such employment." Id. It
is also important to note that the employer is required to keep these records for a specified
period of time. Id. § 1324a(b)(3). On May 4, 1988, the so-called "unauthorized alien amnesty
program" will be abolished. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(l)(A)-(2)(A). "The Attorney General
may adjust the status of an alien to that of an alien admitted for temporary residence if the
alien:" (A) applies before May 4, 1988; and (B) establishes that he entered the United States
before January 1, 1982, and that he has unlawfully resided continuously in the United
States from that time until the application was filed. Id.
6 See infra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
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tutional protection 7 is a violation of the business owner's fourth amend-
ment protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
Prior to the IRCA, INS workplace sweeps were little more than an
inconvenience to the business owners. With the primary purpose of the
raids being to apprehend undocumented workers, the business owner
faced no more than a temporary disruption of the workplace and the
potential loss of easily replaced workers. Now, as both workers and
employers are suspects-the former for unauthorized entry and the latter
for violating the IRCA-INS workplace sweeps have become the major
source of recovering evidence for use against business owners,8 thereby
raising serious constitutional issues which require a re-examination of
the controlling case law.
This Note examines the legal system's scrutiny of the fourth amend-
ment implications of INS workplace sweeps and suggests that the recent
adoption of the IRCA and its criminal sanctions dictate the development
of a higher standard for upholding the constitutionality of workplace
raids. Consideration is first given to the type of INS activity which is
under scrutiny in the course of a workplace sweep. Next, Part III will
examine the development of case law pertaining to the current power of
the INS to constitutionally conduct workplace sweeps under the fourth
amendment. Part IV will then discuss the development of an appropriate
standard against which workplace sweeps must be measured in deter-
mining their legality. Finally, this Note will conclude that the IRCA
mandates the implementation of a standard for the issuance of an INS
warrant based on a showing of probable cause equivalent to that applied
in criminal law enforcement. It will further conclude that search war-
rants based on ethnic appearance are violative of the equal protection
clause and that before a worker may be detained, an INS officer must
have a reasonable suspicion, above ethnic appearance, that the person is
undocumented.
II. THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM AND WORKPLACE RAIDS
Illegal immigration of Mexican citizens is a growing national problem.
It is estimated that between one and twelve million undocumented
immigrants currently reside in the United States,9 the majority consist-
' See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (factory
sweep is not within the fourth amendment protections as it does not constitute a seizure
since workers could reasonably believe they were free to walk away). See also infra notes
73-83 and accompanying text.
8 Comment, Reexamining the Constitutionality of INS Workplace Raids After the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1979, 1981-83 (1987).
' Note, A Reprise of Warrants, Probable Cause, and Articulable Suspicion In Immigra-
tion Enforcement-LaDuke v. Nelson, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1253, 1256 (1984). See also Delgado,
1988]
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ing of Mexican nationals. 10 To combat this influx of immigrants seeking
the economic benefits found in the United States, the INS has developed
an extensive array of enforcement strategies.1 ' While some applaud the
efforts of the INS, 12 the great majority of commentators criticize current
techniques as having: (1) limited effect on the illegal immigration
problem; 1' (2) no justifiable connection between the ends achieved and
the methods used; 14 and (3) violated both the employer's and employee's
fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, 15 because of the INS' tremendous enthusiasm aimed at reme-
dying the immigration problem.
The most prevalent and most criticized enforcement technique used by
the INS is the workplace sweep or raid. These raids take place as fifteen
to twenty-five INS agents move systematically through the work area' 6
with additional officers stationed at all exits and entrances to prevent
escape. 17 Although officers are instructed to be courteous and avoid
466 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., concurring) (recent estimates of the number of illegal aliens in
this country range between 2 and 12 million, although the consensus appears to be that the
number at any one time is between 3 and 6 million); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (1972 INS figures showed one million illegal aliens while 1974 figures
revealed as many as 10 or 12 million illegal aliens).
10 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879 (the government in 1974 estimated that 85% of the
aliens illegally in the country were from Mexico) (citations omitted); Catz, Fourth Amend-
ment Limitations on Non-border Searches for Illegal Aliens: The Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service Meets the Constitution, 39 Omo ST. L.J. 66, n.5 (1978) (approximately 90%
of those arrested were Mexican nationals).
" See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (factory
sweep); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (stationary boarder patrol
checkpoints); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 873 (roving patrol of Mexican Border); LaDuke v.
Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985) (farm and ranch checks of migrant housing).
12 See generally Delgado, 466 U.S. at 210.
13 See generally Note, supra note 9, at 1253; Catz, supra note 10, at 667.
i4 See generally Note, INS Factory Raids as Non-Detentive Seizures, 95 YALE L. REv. 767
(1986) [hereinafter Note, INS Raids]; Note, The Immigration and Naturalization Service
and Racially Motivated Questioning: Does Equal Protection Pick up Where the Fourth
Amendment Left Off? 86 COLUM. L. REv. 800 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Racially Motivated
Questioning].
is The fourth amendment provides "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures... and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. See also LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1318; Note, supra note 9, at 1253; Note, INS
Raids, supra note 14, at 770; Note, Racially Motivated Questioning, supra note 14, at 801.
See generally Caldwell, Seizures of the Fourth Kind: Changing the Rules, 33 CLEv. ST. L. REV.
323 (1985).
1" See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 231 (1984)
(Brennan, J. concurring).
" See International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 631 (9th
Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado 466 U.S. 210
(1984).
[Vol. 36:455
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disruption of the workplace, the agents' entrance is usually followed by
frenzied cries of "La Migra ("the immigration") and attempts by some
workers to hide or run from the INS officers.18 Officers then question each
worker, 19 with those suspected of being undocumented aliens handcuffed
and led away. 20
III. IMMIGRATION CONTROL UNDER A FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS: THE
CURRENT STATE OF WORKPLACE AND NON-WORKPLACE INS ACTIVITY
The fourth amendment provides that:
[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. 21
Traditionally, where the state activity had been termed a "search,"22 the
determination of its legality by the United States Supreme Court was
based on the existence of a search warrant, 23 probable cause, 24 or
consent. 25 More recently, however, the Court has increased the number of
exceptions to the warrant requirement, demanding a warrant only where
a traditional arrest or thorough search takes place. 26 Through this
expansion, the employer's rights are sacrificed in the name of immigra-
tion control.
's Id. at 627.
19 Id.
20 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 230.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
2' The meaning of the word "search" is not easily captured within any verbal formula-
tion. For a current review of searches and their definition see Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) (police use of a listening device on a public phone booth constitutes an
unreasonable search where it infringed on the caller's expectation of privacy). See generally
2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTi AMENDMENT 301-20 (2d ed. 1984).
23 See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (warrant strongly preferred).
24 See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) (probable cause is deeply rooted in our
history).
25 Consent is the classic exception to the warrant requirement. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra
note 22, at 120-21. In the immigration context, consent by owners to INS searches was
commonplace. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. After the IRCA, however, owners
will be less likely to consent as they face criminal sanctions.
" See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (traditional arrest where suspect
is taken into custody and subjected to interrogation).
1988]
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A. Placing Immigration Control in a Criminal Context:
The Fourth Amendment Balancing Test
With the passage of the IRCA, the INS is more akin to a police force
than to an administrative agency. Already possessing the power to
interrogate, without a warrant, any alien or person believed to be an
alien,27 or to arrest any alien in violation of admissions laws,28 the
addition of the power to sanction employers requires that the INS be
regulated by fourth amendment standards identical to those applicable to
criminal law enforcement. To this point, courts have been reluctant to
apply the fourth amendment standards governing police activity to
equivalent behavior by the INS. The illogical result of this reluctance is
that the fourth amendment guarantee offers less protection in an INS
confrontation than in a police confrontation. 29
1. Terry v. Ohio: Non-Arrest Seizures and
Creation of the Balancing Test
In Terry v. Ohio,30 the United States Supreme Court addressed the
issues surrounding "police-citizen" encounters 31 and the fourth amend-
ment, suggesting that an encounter amounting to less than a technical
arrest or a full blown search may be within the amendment's
parameters. 32 In Terry, an experienced police detective observed two
strangers repeatedly walking past a particular store. Suspecting that
criminal activity was afoot, the detective approached the men, identified
himself as an officer, and asked their names. When the men "mumbled
something in response," the detective grabbed Terry and patted down his
outside clothing without placing his hands under the outer garment until
he felt what he reasonably believed to be a gun. Terry was then ordered
into the store, where the gun was removed from the pocket of his
overcoat. 3
3
The issue before the Court was whether the detective's activities were
27 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (1986).
28 Id. § 1357(a)(2).
2 Note, INS Raids, supra note 14, at 767. The disparity in the amount of protection
afforded one's fourth amendment rights in the criminal arena as opposed to that in an
immigration context is unexplainable in light of the powers now possessed by the INS. As
both the police and INS are empowered to enforce criminal laws, logic dictates that they be
held to identical standards. See Comment, supra note 8, at 2000. See also Note, Racially
Motivated Questioning, supra note 14, at 334-36.
30 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
31 Id. at 13. "[E]ncounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich
in diversity. They range from wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or mutually useful
information to hostile confrontations of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or loss of
life." Id. See Caldwell, supra note 15, at 323-24.
32 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
3 Id. at 4-7.
[Vol. 36:455
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such as to constitute a search and/or a seizure; and if so, whether the
search or seizure was reasonable under the circumstances. Rejecting the
belief that the fourth amendment does not come into play absent a
"'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown search,"' 34 and adopting the view that
"whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom
to walk away, he has seized that person,"35 Chief Justice Warren declared
that Terry had unquestionably been seized and subjected to a search
when his outer garments were patted down. 36 The so-called "stop-and-
frisk" was now within the purview of the fourth amendment's
protections.37
Having acknowledged the existence of both a search and a seizure, the
Court moved to the issue of reasonableness. Faced with a decision
complicated by the absence of probable cause, Chief Justice Warren,
citing that the Court was dealing with "an entire rubric of police
conduct-necessary swift action predicated upon on the spot observations
of the officer," rejected the extremes of (1) requiring probable cause, thus
leaving the police incapable of investigating suspicious behavior; and (2)
adhering to past holdings which would render the scenario outside fourth
amendment protections. 38 Taking an intermediate stance to evaluate the
reasonableness of a stop-and-frisk, the Terry Court adopted a balancing
test, pitting the governmental interest served by the search or seizure
against the degree of intrusion on individual fourth amendment rights.39
The stop-and-frisk scenario was now to be regulated by a reasonable
suspicion standard. 40
2. Application of the Balancing Test to INS Non-Workplace Activity
In the immigration context, the balancing test and seizure definition
announced in Terry were first applied outside the workplace. In Almeida-
34 Id. at 19.
35 Id. at 16. "It is quite plain that the fourth amendment governs 'seizures' of the person
which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime-'arrests' in
traditional terminology." Id.
36 Id. at 19.
" Traditionally, a distinction was drawn between a "stop" and an "arrest" or "seizure"
of the person and between a "frisk" and a "search." Id. at 17 n.15. Early cases held that a
frisk was not a "search" and that the "stop" without an arrest was not a seizure. State v.
Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 125-30, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441,
201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965). The view taken
by the Terry Court recognizes that the fourth amendment governs all intrusions by agents
of the public upon personal security. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n.15 (1968).
38 392 U.S. at 16-20. See Note, INS Raids, supra note 14, at 1987.
3" 392 U.S. at 20-21.
40 The Court requires that "in justifying the particular intrusion the officer must point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. (citations omitted). This determination is not
to be based on unparticularized suspicion or a hunch. Id. at 27.
1988]
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Sanchez v. United States,41 the Court was asked to rule on the constitu-
tionality of vehicle searches by roving border patrols. 42 In what Justice
Powell's concurrence termed a "relatively unstructured" application of
the balancing test,43 the five member majority found that absent
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained illegal aliens, the
government's interest in deterring unlawful immigration was insuffi-
cient to justify the severe infringement on fourth amendment rights
entailed by a roving border patrol's nonconsensual vehicle search. 44
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,45 the Court was asked to determine
the United States Border Patrol's authority to stop automobiles, not to
search them, but to question the occupants about their citizenship and
immigration status.46 Applying the Terry standard, the Court found that
the minimal intrusion of a brie,07 stop for questioning purposes was
justified by the state's interest in protecting the public and preventing
crime. 48 Like the stop-and-frisk in Terry, the Brignoni-Ponce Court did
not require probable cause for the stop,49 but rather that the roving
41 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
42 Petitioner was a Mexican citizen and holder of a valid work permit. He was stopped
by border police 25 air miles north of the Mexican border on a highway which runs parallel
to the border without touching it. Without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, the
vehicle was searched, uncovering a large quantity of marijuana. Petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of the warrantless search. Id. at 267-68. The border patrol conducts three
types of surveillance along roadways with the aim of deterring the illegal importation of
aliens: (1) permanent check points at certain major intersections; (2) temporary checkpoints
at various places; and (3) roving patrols such as the one at issue. Id. at 268.
41 Id. at 283-84 (Powell, J., concurring); See Catz, supra note 10, at 75-78; Comment,
supra note 7, at 1986. Justice Powell's concurrence is of significance as the 5-4 split of the
Court creates some uncertainty regarding the opinion. Advocating a somewhat different
type of probable cause, Justice Powell suggested that certain factors pertaining to the area
searched-i.e., geographic region-may be substituted for particular knowledge of the
persons or vehicle. 413 U.S. at 283-84 (Powell, J., concurring). With the four dissenters
showing signs of support for such a standard, id. at 288 (White, J., dissenting), the majority
of the Court appeared to view roving patrols as constitutional if supported by an "area
warrant" issued on less than probable cause. See Catz, supra note 10, at 79.
44 413 U.S. at 273.
45 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
46 Respondent was traveling near the Mexican border. A usual fixed checkpoint was
closed due to weather, but officers were observing northbound traffic from a patrol car.
Respondent's car was stopped solely because the three occupants appeared of Mexican
descent. The officers questioned the occupants and upon determining they were illegally in
the country, arrested them. Id. at 880.
4" The Court's decision is specifically limited to the "minimal intrusion of a brief stop,"
usually lasting about one minute. Id. at 880-81.
41 Id. at 881.
"' The Brignoni-Ponce Court distinguished Almeida-Sanchez on the ground that a stop
for questioning was less intrusive than a search, and that the stop was near the border. Id.
at 876-77.
[Vol. 36:455
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patrols have a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained aliens who
may be in the country illegally.50
In a third decision, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,51 the Court was
asked to rule on the constitutionality of fixed checkpoint stops where,
absent any warrant, probable cause, or particularized suspicion, vehicles
were referred selectively to a secondary inspection area for questioning
about citizenship and immigration status.52 In a sharp divergence from
the limitations of INS powers exhibited in Almeida-Sanchez and
Brignoni-Ponce, the Court, while admitting that a seizure had occurred, 53
held such a stop to be constitutional. 54 Applying the Terry standard, as
did its predecessors, the Martinez-Fuerte Court found the intrusion on the
individual's fourth amendment interests to be "quite limited,"55 while the
need of the government to conduct such stops was "great" and "the most
important of the traffic-checking operations."56
Distinguishing from the reasonable suspicion requirement of Almeida-
Sanchez, and rejecting the idea of particularized suspicion, the Court
reasoned that "the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible require-
ment of such suspicion."57 In adopting such a position, the Court added
fuel to the fire started by Justice Powell's concurrence in Almeida-
o Any number of factors may be included in the determination of reasonable suspicion,
i.e., characteristics of the area, proximity to the border, the driver's behavior, appearance of
the vehicle, characteristics of the occupants, etc.. Id. at 885 (citations omitted).
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
52 The checkpoint in question was the Interstate 5, San Clemente checkpoint, located 66
miles north of the border. Interstate 5 is the principle highway between San Diego and Los
Angeles. At the checkpoint, a point agent, standing between 2 lanes of traffic, visually
screens northbound vehicles as they slowly move through the checkpoint. In a small
number of cases the point agent will motion a vehicle to a secondary inspection area, where
investigation may last 3-5 minutes.
In the instant case, Martinez-Fuerte, a U.S. citizen, was driving with two female
passengers, both illegal aliens. At the checkpoint, the car was sent to the secondary
investigation area, where the passengers admitted their illegal status. Martinez-Fuerte was
charged with illegal transportation of aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1986). Id.
at 546-49.
53 Id. at 556. "It is agreed that checkpoint stops are 'seizures' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." Id.
54 Id. at 562.
5 The Court reasons that "Itihe stop does intrude to a limited extent on motorists' right
to 'free passage' without interruption.... [I]t involves only a brief detention." Id. at 557-58.
w 428 U.S. at 556-57. The Court cited the necessity of a traffic checking program in the
interior, since illegal entry cannot be controlled at the border. "A requirement that stops on
major routes inland always be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical" because
heavy traffic hampers close study of a vehicle. Id. at 557.
57 Id. at 561.
1988]
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Sanchez58 by citing the fact that area warrants had been upheld in
certain circumstances. 59
The application of the criminal standards developed in Terry to INS
non-workplace activity has yielded confusing results. In a span of three
years 60 the Court moved from a position severely limiting the power of
the INS to one removing any requirements of justification for a seizure in
particular situations. As will be seen in the following analysis of the
application of Terry to the workplace, Martinez-Fuerte is indicative of a
trend which, under the current IRCA, is in need of reversal.
B. Application of the Terry Standard to INS Workplace Activity
1. Establishment of a Civil Administrative Standard for
INS Search Warrants
In Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo,61 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, upheld an INS search warrant based on less than
traditional probable cause, 62 holding that because an INS search is
conducted pursuant to a civil administrative mandate, a warrant issued
for such a search is not required to be evaluated under the probable cause
standard applied to criminal warrants.63 In distinguishing the search in
Blackie's from those occurring in a criminal context, the court noted that
the detention and deportation of illegal aliens is not a criminal law
enforcement activity as there is no sanction, criminal or otherwise,
imposed upon a knowing employer of illegal aliens.64 The purpose behind
the issuance of the warrant was held to be aiding the INS in the exercise
of its civil statutory mandate, not the aiding of police in enforcing
criminal laws.6
58 Id. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
" The decision in Martinez-Fuerte was by a 7-2 vote. Following the logic discussed in
notes 43-44, supra, it appears that Justice Powell's logic has won out, indicating a trend
toward awarding the INS more power with less restrictions.
so This refers to the three year span between 1973-Almeida-Sanchez- and 1976-
Martinez-Fuerte.
61 659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982).
62 The warrant in Blackie's failed to particularly describe the persons to be searched for,
a traditional requirement of a criminal warrant. On a standard form warrant, with the word
"property" marked out and the word "persons" filled in, the warrant specified a search of
"the entire premises ... there is now being concealed certain persons namely Aliens .... "
The district court found the warrant to be inadequately supported by a criminal type
probable cause standard. Id. at 1214-15.
6 Id. at 1218-19 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)).
6 Id. at 1218. See also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (deportation of
illegal aliens is not criminal enforcement activity).
6 659 F.2d at 1218. A showing of less than criminal probable cause was found
appropriate because (1) Congress contemplated vigorous INS enforcement; (2) INS activity
is distinguishable from criminal investigation as the employer faces no sanction; and (3) the
[Vol. 36:455
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With the determination that an administrative standard of probable
cause was appropriate for the issuance of an INS warrant, the Blackie's
court was left to define the parameters of such a standard. Unclear as to
how to proceed, the court defined a hybrid standard of probable cause. 66
In a synthesis of the decisions in Marshall v. Ballow,6 7 Delaware v.
Prouse,68 and Camara v. Municipal Court,69 the Blackie's court noted
that, in a civil administrative context, the permissibility of a law
enforcement practice is determined by balancing the intrusion on the
individual's fourth amendment rights against the promotion of legiti-
mate state interests.70 Where sufficient specificity and reliability are
found to "prevent the exercise of unbridled discretion by law enforcement
officials," 71 this balance favors the state. In sum, although not requiring
a particular description of the persons to be seized, the court found the
balancing test to require that the warrant specify the location, time and
scope of the search if it was to be upheld. 72 By such a decision, the court
severely impaired the right of business owners to be free from arbitrary
and capricious administratively mandated searches.
2. INS v. Delgado: Taking Immigration Outside
the Fourth Amendment
In 1984, the Supreme Court announced the most controversial decision
in the immigration line of cases in Immigration and Naturalization
Services v. Delgado.73 Acting pursuant to two warrants, the INS con-
ducted a workplace sweep of Southern California Davis Pleating Co.
[hereinafter Davis Co.], searching for undocumented aliens. The war-
rants were based on a showing of probable cause that numerous illegal
balancing test is satisfied. Id. International Molder's and Allied Workers' Local Union No.
164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1986) (to the extent that warrants authorize the INS
to seize employees suspected of being illegal aliens, "probable cause" is required).
66 799 F.2d at 553. Hybrid is taken to mean a rational compromise between the pure
warrantless standard and the strict probable cause standard of purely criminal searches.
See infra notes 67-69.
67 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (warrant is required for searches conducted pursuant to
administrative mandate to protect individual's fourth amendment interest in reasonable-
ness).
63 440 U.S. 648 (1979) ([r]easonableness shall be determined by weighing the state's
interest against the interest in freedom from intrusion on privacy and security).
69 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (warrantless administrative searches are not justified on grounds
they make minimal demands on occupants).
70 Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982).
7' 659 F.2d at 1225 (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654).
72 659 F.2d at 1226. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1981-82.
73 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
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aliens were employed by Davis Co. Neither warrant particularly de-
scribed or otherwise identified any undocumented alien.74
Upon entering the factory, agents were positioned at all entrances and
exits, with additional agents moving systematically through the factory
questioning most, but not all of the work force. Armed and displaying
badges, the agents asked the employees, who were still at their work
stations, between one and three questions. If the agents believed the
worker to be a United States citizen, the questioning stopped. If the
employee gave an unsatisfactory response, she was asked to produce her
immigration papers. During the sweep, employees not being questioned
continued their work and were free to walk around the factory. Four
employees questioned in the sweep challenged the search as a violation of
both their fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures and the equal protection component of the due process
clause. 75
In Delgado, a widely criticized decision,76 the Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union v. Sureck.77 The Delgado Court failed to recognize any
constitutional grounds of protection, fourth amendment or otherwise, for
workplace sweeps. 78 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist looked to
Delgado's non-workplace predecessors as a means of escaping the prob-
lems created by the Terry seizure definition. Reminding us that "the
fourth amendment does not proscribe all contact between the police and
citizens, but is designed 'to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference
by law enforcement officials with privacy and personal security of
individuals,"'7 9 Justice Rehnquist applied the Terry standard ° and
74 Id. at 213.
75 Id.
76 The Delgado decision has been widely criticized by commentators due to its holding
on the seizure issue. See Note, Constitutional Law-INS Raids on Garment Factories-The
Fourth Amendment and Expediency, 18 CREmroN L. REV. 151, 151-53 (1984) (INS work
sweeps violate the fourth amendment); Note, Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Delgado: Factory Raids: Seizure or Brief Encounter?, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 509, 510 (1985)
(work sweeps without articulable suspicion or a warrant violate the fourth amendment);
Caldwell, supra note 15, at 326.
71 International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir.
1982). The holding in the lower court concluded that the entire work force had been seized
because, with agents at all the doors, no reasonable worker would feel that she was free to
walk away. Id. at 634. The Ninth Circuit also required that an employee could only be
questioned on a reasonable suspicion that she was an undocumented alien. Id. at 639-45.
78 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218-21 (1984).
79 466 U.S. at 215 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 544 (1976)).
"o Justice Rehnquist applied a standard different than that applied in Terry. The test
used by Justice Rehnquist was found in a footnote in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16
(1968), but was not applied in that case. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. The
test applied in Delgado included the components of physical force and show of authority. 466
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upheld the sweep, determining that the questioned workers could hardly
have believed they were not free to walk away8 ' as they were engaged in
"classic consensual encounters rather than fourth amendment sei-
zures."82 Analogizing to the fixed check-point stops of Martinez-Fuerte,
the Court dismissed the idea that any restricted freedom was due to the
workplace atmosphere rather than the psychological effect of an invasion
by armed INS agents. 83 The majority concluded that the INS activity was
unintrusive and did not merit fourth amendment protection.
3. LaDuke v. Nelson: Probable Cause and
Particularized Suspicion Return
In 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reaffirmed its position on the protection of fourth amendment rights in an
immigration context through8 4 its holding in LaDuke v. Nelson.85 Care-
fully reasoned, 86 the court's holding is essential to an understanding of
the problems facing both workers and employers under the IRCA.
In LaDuke, three United States citizens sought an injunction prohib-
iting the INS from conducting raids on farm labor housing 7 without a
valid search warrant on the grounds that the raids violated their fourth
amendment rights. The plaintiffs were residents in the Spokane Sector,8 8
an area frequently subject to surprise warrantless searches by the INS.
Typically, armed border patrol agents cordoned off migrant housing
during early morning or late evening hours, surrounded the residences
with emergency vehicles and flashing lights, and conducted house to
house searches either without consent or with the supposed "knowing"
consent of the occupants. Residents were not advised of their right to
U.S. at 215. Although these elements are arguably satisfied in Delgado, the use of the
"footnote" test allowed Justice Rehnquist to finesse his way around the application of Terry.
8 Id. at 220-21.
s2 Id. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544 (1980).
" See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 220 (1984). The
psychological pressures were among the respondent's strongest arguments on the seizure
question. See also infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
84 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit was also the court
which was overruled in the Delgado decision. As will be seen, the Ninth Circuit's decisions
may have been before their time. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
s5 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985).
86 See infra notes 104-15 and accompanying text.
" Farmers who have sufficient crops to require the extensive use of hand labor often
provide quarters for the workers. The fact that the court considers the farm housing to be
a residence rather than a workplace is the first distinction drawn by the court. See infra
notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
88 This area is comprised of eastern Washington, a part of northern Idaho, and a part of
Montana. LaDuke v. Nelson, 560 F. Supp. 158, 160 (E.D. Wash. 1982), aff'd, 762 F.2d 1318
(9th Cir. 1985).
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refuse the officers entry.8 9 Those who fled or were otherwise suspected of
being illegal aliens were arrested. 90
In affirming the district court's decision to grant an injunction against
the INS, the Ninth Circuit emphasized three components: (1) warrantless
entries of farm dwellings were barred absent clear consent or probable
cause; (2) warrantless searches of migrant farm dwellings were barred
absent probable cause; and (3) "stopping, detaining, and interrogating
[migrant workers] by force, threats of force, or a command based on official
authority, absent a warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion based
on articulable facts that the person is an [illegal alien] "91 was barred. In
the application of the balancing test, the court, while not disputing the
legitimacy of the INS' enforcement needs, found that the housing sweeps
could not be viewed as a "casual encounter," as the intrusiveness of such
searches causes them to "run afoul of the fourth amendment."
92
IV. THE NECESSITY OF A PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD FOR INS ACTIVITY
Under current law, arrests and full searches require probable cause, 93
while a less intrusive detention will require only a showing of reasonable
suspicion. 94 Where the activity falls below this requisite level of intru-
sion, minimally intrusive or non-detentive activities require no showing
of suspicion.95 In the context of immigration enforcement, once a civil
administrative standard of probable cause is met, 96 INS workplace raids
do not run afoul of the fourth amendment as no action of the INS agents
in the course of such raids constitutes an unreasonable search or
seizure. 97 The development of such a standard, however, has blurred the
distinction between the different degrees of intrusiveness and has created
a situation which allows the courts to justify constitutional infringement
as being in accord with the balancing test established in Terry.
The enactment of the IRCA creates an urgent need for the establish-
" 560 F. Supp. at 159.
90 Id. See Note, supra note 9, at 1262.
91 762 F. 2d at 1331.
92 id.
93 United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (search warrant); Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) (arrest warrant). See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, at
18-50.
14 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). See also supra notes 30-40 and accompanying
text.
" Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). For a detailed
explanation of the holding, see supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text. For criticism of
the decision, see infra notes 113-34.
" See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text. For criticism of this standard see infra
notes 98-112 and accompanying text.
17 See generally 466 U.S. at 218-20.
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ment of strict standards in the application of the Terry test to INS
workplace sweeps. When the current standards were developed, no
criminal sanctions against the business owner were available. With the
IRCA now in place, the rationale behind the relevant decisions becomes
outdated and the need for a criminal standard of probable cause becomes
apparent.
A. The Warrant Requirement
The court's now outdated thinking is exhibited by the establishment of
the civil administrative standard for the issuance of INS search
warrants. 98 With the Blackie's decision resting on the absence of criminal
sanction against the employer, the new IRCA fatally undermines the
court's rationale. Because pattern offenders of the IRCA face severe fines
and imprisonment, 99 the INS is no longer serving a civil administrative
function, but rather, is serving one of criminal law enforcement. As such,
the INS should be held to comply with a standard of probable cause
equivalent to that required in the criminal context.
The standard to be applied is one of specific individualized suspicion.
The fourth amendment specifically commands that no warrant shall issue
without particularly describing "the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized."'100 In Michigan v. Tyler 10, the Supreme Court
made it clear that, although administratively mandated searches do not
require probable cause when limited to administrative purposes,
10 2
where government agents seek access to a workplace to "gather evidence
for a possible prosecution," a warrant will be obtained "only upon a
traditional showing of probable cause applicable to searches for evidence
of crimes."'01 3 To meet the constitutional standard thus required of INS
investigations under the IRCA, INS warrants must contain names or
particular descriptions of the specific undocumented alien to be seized.'
0 4
To completely accept the probable cause standard as applicable to the
INS warrants requires that it be reconciled within the structure of the
balancing test. It may be argued that the IRCA does not completely shift
the INS' function to the criminal sphere, but rather, creates a dual
98 See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
100 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
'01 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
102 Id. at 507.
103 id. at 512. The Tyler Court was dealing with evidence of alleged arson. The Court held
that a subsequent investigation of the fire site required traditional probable cause. Id.
(citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1964)).
104 See Blackie's House of Beef v. Castillo, 480 F. Supp. 1078, 1085, 1090 (D.D.C. 1979),
rev'd, 659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982). See generally 2 W.
LaFave, supra note 22, at 206-33.
1988]
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
function engaging both administrative and criminal authority. Accep-
tance of this view places two diametrically opposed power structures at
odds. On the one hand "regulatory or enforcement authority generally
carries with it all the modes of inquiry necessary to execute the authority
granted."' 05 On the other hand, criminal enforcement activity is strictly
governed by constitutional guidelines. The confrontation is one of state
power versus individual protection. Because of the severity of this
conflict, a single standard is necessary to avoid inconsistent ap-
plication. 0 6
Placed in the context of the balancing test, the criminal standard must
prevail. In support of the lesser standard, the INS argues that a probable
cause standard will inhibit its administrative function of immigration
regulation.10 7 When placed against the infringement, such a standard
places on both the employer and the employee's fourth amendment
rights, this argument is lost. Requiring the INS to obtain specific
information about the unauthorized alien to be seized places very little
extra burden on the agency. The necessary information may be easily
obtained by the INS through the use of data bases, undercover operations,
informants, or specific leads.' 08 While the use of such techniques may
necessitate additional funding, this cost is insufficient to counteract the
weight afforded individual protection under the balancing test.
Further, the adoption of the lesser standard would fail to recognize the
changes made by the IRCA. Whether one accepts the criminal function
argument or the dual purpose argument, there is no doubt that a change
has occurred. To accept the lower standard will allow the courts to
advance administrative convenience as a justification for even the most
intrusive searches.1o9 The difficulty with such a justification arises in
light of the criminal function of the INS. While the administrative
purposes of the search may be sufficient to justify deportation of the
illegal aliens found in such a sweep, the use of these aliens as evidence in
the prosecution of the business owner will be subject to the exclusionary
10' Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (use of aerial observation and
photography is within E.P.A.'s statutory authority).
"' If the application of the applicable standard is left to a case by case analysis,
inconsistent application is sure to result. To avoid inconsistencies, a single standard is
required.
107 See Brief for Petitioner, Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, at 27.
'os Comment, Individualized Suspicion in Factory Searches-The "least intrusive alter-
native", 21 Am. Ciu. L. REv. 403, 421-22 (1984). The INS has long had at its disposal a
number of techniques for identifying particular illegal aliens. Id. The INS may argue that
in light of the large number of illegal aliens coming into the country, such a standard is a
heavy burden. However, when placed within the confines of the balancing test, the burden
on the state is much less than the possibility of injuring individual rights.
1o See L. TiuE, AMERICAN CONSrrrtIONAL LAw 1001-02 (1978).
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rule 110 thereby defeating the purpose of the Act.111 By comparison, the
probable cause standard affords the individual the requisite constitu-
tional protection while simultaneously allowing the INS to properly
execute both its administrative and criminal functions.
112
B. The Seizure: Re-Thinking Delgado
The Court's finding in Delgado, that INS workplace sweeps do not
constitute fourth amendment seizures, was based on the idea that a
seizure occurs "if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to
leave."113 Despite the Court's holding, an understanding of the law in
Terry and the conditions under which an INS sweep takes place shows
that the Ninth Circuit was correct in holding that the employees had
been seized. By fatally aligning freedom of movement with the liberty
interest associated with the ability to "walk away," Justice Rehnquist
was able to reject the claim that the entire work force was seized even
though agents were posted at all the exits. Although the workers were
free to move about the factory, there can be no doubt that they were not
free to leave. 1 4
To support this proposition, critics need only look to the irrational
implications of a strict interpretation of Delgado." 5 If Justice Rehnquist's
determinations are accepted as correct, Delgado constitutionally empow-
ers workers to refuse to answer questions or walk away when approached
110 The exclusionary rule requires that evidence determined to have been unconstitu-
tionally obtained be excluded from that which may be admitted at trial as against the
individual whose rights were violated. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The
purpose behind this rule is to deter unreasonable searches and seizures by state actors. See
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). For general discussion of the exclusionary rule see 1
W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 132-62 (1984).
... The purpose behind the change of the IRCA was to diminish the number of aliens
encouraged to work in the United States by imposing criminal sanctions on those who hired
them. If the possibility of such a sanction is practically removed through the exclusionary
rule, the purpose is defeated.
112 The primary function is to prosecute IRCA violators. The probable cause standard
will require sufficient proof prior to the issuance of a warrant to avoid exclusionary rule
concerns.
113 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984).
114 Id. at 218.
115 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. "Ordinarily, when people are at work
their freedom to move about has been meaningfully restricted, not by actions of law
enforcement officials, but by the workers' voluntary obligations to their employers." 466
U.S. at 218. Some degree of proof does show workers may have been free to leave and not
known it. The facts show that a worker walked out the door and when the agent tried to stop
him, the worker pushed him aside and ran away without further incident. The Court held
that no conclusions may be drawn from such ambiguous and isolated behavior. Id. at 218
n.6.
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by INS agents. 116 In reality, resistance to INS questioning results in
increased suspicion and encourages INS agents to take additional steps to
determine the status of the uncooperative worker. 11 7 With flight or
resistance generating increased scrutiny of the worker, there is an
absence of a reasonable belief that the worker is free to leave and thus, a
seizure occurs under the fourth amendment.
Compounding the physical intrusiveness of workplace sweeps is the
psychological toll exacted on both legal and illegal workers. From the
outset of a workplace sweep, minority workers, the direct target of
citizenship questioning by the INS, 11 are placed in a defensive stance
caused by the fear of discriminatory enforcement. INS agents rarely
announce or otherwise communicate to the workers that only illegal
aliens are to be arrested." 9 Even assuming the workers subjected to the
sweeps are aware of this purpose, the fear of those legally working that
they may be mistaken for an illegal alien or that their citizenship will be
disbelieved, is in no way lessened. 120 Based on its recognition of
"wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community,"121
the Supreme Court has acknowledged the existence of this psychological
effect, holding that minorities may feel "unusually threatened" when
confronted by white male officers. 122 The overall result of these factory
sweeps is to produce in many workers a state of anxiety concerning future
sweeps and subsequent arrests.123 Notwithstanding the holding of Del-
gado, the totality of the circumstances does not give rise to the belief that
the workers are free to leave in the course of such a search.
A final flaw of the Delgado Court's analysis was its reliance on the
116 See Comment, supra note 8, at 1985; Note, supra note 9, at 1258; Note, INS Raids,
supra note 14, at 772; Caldwell, supra note 15, at 332-34.
117 Comment, supra note 8, at 1985; Caldwell, supra note 15, at 332-34.
1 Note, INS Raids, supra note 14, at 772. See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975) (the likelihood of a person of Mexican ancestry being an alien is
high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor in requiring questioning);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (apparent Mexican ancestry
sufficient to question at border auto checkpoint); Yam Sang Kwai v. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 411 F.2d 683, 687 (D.C. Cir.) (questioning of suspect caused by
appearance of Asian descent), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 877 (1969).
119 See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984).
120 Id.
121 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968). The Court continues, noting that "the degree of
community resentment aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant to an assessment
of the quality of the intrusion upon reasonable expectations of personal security caused by
those practices." Id. at 17 n.14.
122 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (fact that black female may be
intimidated by white male officers is relevant but not decisive).
123 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (INS
agents warned a worker they would return to check on him because he spoke english too
well).
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easily distinguished non-workplace line of cases.1 24 By adopting the
opinion of the Martinez-Fuerte Court that not all police-citizen encoun-
ters are governed by the fourth amendment, 125 the Court appeared to be
analogizing factory sweeps with auto checkpoints.1 26 These INS activi-
ties, however, are not analogous.
As noted by the Martinez-Fuerte Court, "one's expectation of privacy in
an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly different
from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one's
residence." 127 The issue raised is to which is a factory more comparable,
an auto or a residence? In light of the IRCA, it is the latter.128 The degree
of intrusiveness between the activities is distinctly different. In an auto
stop the intrusion on the interest of the motorist is minimal.129 Drivers
are stopped only briefly, to allow agents to look into the car as could any
other person on the road. A business establishment, however, plainly
enjoys certain protections under the fourth amendment 130 and sweeps are
highly intrusive. The factory owner "has a reasonable, legitimate, and
objective expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered build-
ings, and it is equally clear that expectation is one society is prepared to
observe."'131 Like the occupant of a residence, the businessman has a
constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable
entries on his private commercial property. 132 Under the current law, the
INS may search the premises of a non-consenting business owner,
133
disrupting the workplace, seizing workers, and amassing evidence
against the owner, simply by meeting the civil administrative warrant
requirement. 34 While the expectation of privacy in the workplace does
not reach the exact level accorded the home, this resemblance is far
greater than that of a factory and an auto.' 35
124 See supra notes 41-60 and accompanying text.
125 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984).
126 See id. at 221 (Powell, J., concurring).
127 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (citations omitted).
128 For an analogy of workplace to a residence see infra notes 165-70 and accompanying
text.
129 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562 ("resulting intrusion on the interest of the motorist
[is] minimal."); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, SF No. 25001 (Cal. Oct. 29, 1987) (sobriety
checkpoints are unintrusive and reasonable within guidelines of Terry).
13o Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986) (aerial photographs
taken of the outside areas of the plant do not infringe on the owners expectation of privacy)
(citing Marshal v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967)).
131 Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 236.
2 Id. at 237. See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967).
133 This assumes, under current law, that the civil administrative standard is met. See
supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
134 Id. See also notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
"' Autos are open for public viewing. They are easily looked into and state window
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Had the Delgado Court correctly considered the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding INS raids, the decision would have been different. 16
While Delgado is still good law, the weight of the evidence shows that
INS workplace sweeps are both physically and psychologically intimidat-
ing to the point that no reasonable person could possibly feel free to leave.
When combined with the damage which may be inflicted upon business
owners under the IRCA, a per se rule declaring all INS workplace raids
to be seizures appears appropriate. By adopting the per se rule, the
criminal function of the INS would be recognized and a probable cause
standard would become an absolute necessity.
C. Constitutional Considerations Outside the Fourth Amendment
In addition to fourth amendment concerns, serious equal protection 137
issues arise out of the INS' current practice of establishing probable cause
and reasonable suspicion solely through ethnic appearance. Because the
amnesty provision1 38 of the IRCA significantly reduces the probative
value of ethnic appearance, a clear determination of the weight to be
accorded this evidence is required. 139
The Supreme Court held in Brignoni-Ponce140 that Mexican appear-
ance alone was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion as required
by Terry,'4 ' although it may be considered as a factor. The constraints
drawn by Brignoni-Ponce, however, have been avoided by the subsequent
determinations in Martinez-Fuerte142 and Delgado 143 that because INS
tinting laws often require that they remain that way. Factories, however, are operated
behind closed doors and often behind walls obstructing both the public's view and that of
business competitors. The business owner is free to decide who comes on company property
and who does not. While not identical to the expectation of privacy in a home, the factory
owner does possess an expectation of privacy well above that of an auto owner.
136 See Caldwell, supra note 15, at 333.
137 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id.
131 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(1)(A)-(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). See also notes 1-7 and accom-
panying text.
139 See Comment, supra note 8, at 1996. The statistics clearly illustrate the reduction of
probative value. Sixty-two percent (12.4 million) of the Hispanic population lives in four
border states, of whom, roughly 2.5 million were unauthorized. Assuming that sixty percent
of these immigrants participate in the legalization program, 850,000 unauthorized aliens
will remain while the lawfully present population will grow to roughly 11.6 million. Thus,
potentially only seven percent of all persons of hispanic ancestry in the border states will be
illegal. Id.
140 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
141 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1968). Under Terry, a reasonable suspicion is required for a
detention. Id.
142 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (this intrusion is so sufficiently minimal that no particular-
ized reason need justify it).
143 466 U.S. 210, 218-21 (1984).
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operations are unintrusive, no seizure results, and thus reasonable
suspicion is not required to detain a suspected illegal alien.
Where a government agency invidiously discriminates against a class
on the basis of national origin or racial appearance, 144 it will be subject to
strict scrutiny.145 Under this standard, a suspect classification will be
upheld only where the state can demonstrate that the classification is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in the least
restrictive manner.146 The INS' sole reliance on racial appearance to
articulate reasonable suspicion neither serves a compelling state
interest 147 nor is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. As
has been seen, the INS has at its disposal a number of less convenient and
more costly alternative methods to establish a compelling state
interest.148 Under an equal protection analysis, however, administrative
convenience is insufficient to establish a compelling state interest. 149
A second major deficiency is that the INS' use of ethnic appearance in
the decision to detain a specific worker is fatally overinclusive. 150 With
only seven percent of all Hispanics in the Border states being unautho-
rized aliens, the chances of a particular Hispanic worker being actually
undocumented are insufficient to justify the infringement a mistake
would make on a citizen's or legal alien's constitutional rights. 51 In light
of these equal protection problems, ethnic appearance alone is insuffi-
cient to establish either probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Protecting against ethnic discrimination dictates that the courts care-
fully scrutinize the facts put forth by the INS to establish either
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Because of the equal protection
problems associated with racial appearance, a magistrate must deter-
144 National origin and racial appearance are "suspect classifications" and as such, will
be held to a strict scrutiny standard. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
A suspect classification is said to be one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
145 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
145 See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 201,
217 (1982); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954).
147 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980). "Only two of this Court's modern
cases have held the use of racial classification to be constitutional." Id. (Citing Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (wartime required the exclusion of people of Japanese
ancestry); Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (wartime exclusion of people of
Japanese ancestry, but must offer opportunity to show loyalty)).
148 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
' See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,825 (1977); Note, Racially Motivated Questioning,
supra note 14, at 819-20.
150 Where it is extreme, over-inclusiveness may be fatal under strict scrutiny. See Ex
parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
151 Comment, supra note 7, at 1999.
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mine that non-racial factors actually motivated the INS activity. 152 By
prohibiting the INS' use of ethnic appearance, both warrant procedures
and questioning practices will be brought within constitutional require-
ments. Under the spirit of Terry and its progeny, such a restriction is
mandatory.
D. LaDuke v. Nelson: The Prototypical Standard
The holding in LaDuke is essential to the movement of the law toward
a standard which conforms to the needs of the IRCA. Although decided
before the IRCA was passed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals prohib-
ited searches without probable cause, effective consent, or valid warrants.
Farm workers may be detained only where INS agents possesses a valid
warrant, probable cause or articulable suspicion.
In conjunction with the holding of the case, a thorough understanding
of LaDuke's relationship to Delgado is essentia1 53 as on the surface, the
facts appear distinguishable.
The first distinction drawn by the court pertained to the area searched.
In Delgado, the INS raided a factory, while in LaDuke the INS swept
through farm housing. 54 The premise of this distinction was that farm
housing did not constitute a workplace and, as such, the LaDuke search
of a "residence" constituted a level of intrusiveness protected even under
the Delgado rationale.155
A second factor cited by the LaDuke court was the disparity between
the authority granted the INS agents prior to each of the two searches.156
In Delgado, the agents acted pursuant to warrants issued on a showing
that numerous unidentified illegal aliens were employed at the factory.1 57
No such warrant was issued in LaDuke nor was there any specific
showing of consent.158 While general criminal law advocates warrantless
searches in certain circumstances, a mere articulable suspicion, without
more, will be insufficient to justify an intrusion as grievous as that into
152 Note, Racially Motivated Questioning, supra note 14, at 818.
' The two decisions appear to be dealing with two entirely different types of INS
activity. When looked at carefully, however, the IRCA places them in a different perspective
suggesting that they are not as different as it may seem. See infra notes 163-72 and
accompanying text.
1 LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1328 (9th Cir. 1985).
151 See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 224 (1984)
(Powell, J., concurring). A warrantless search of a residence under the circumstances found
in LaDuke would likely have been held unconstitutional by the Delgado Court. Id.
' See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
157 466 U.S. at 212.
s 762 F.2d at 1328 n.13, 1332 n.19.
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a residence. 159 As the court determined the farm houses to be residences,
the searches were unconstitutional.
A final distinction which sets LaDuke apart is the procedural history of
each case.' 60 In Delgado, the Court was asked to rule on the adequacy of
a summary judgment in favor of the INS, thus requiring that all issues of
fact be resolved in favor of the agency. 16, As the degree of fear felt by the
factory workers was a question of fact, the Court was within its powers
16 2
to find the Delgado activity to be non-threatening. LaDuke, however, is
based on an appeal from a trial on the merits.16 3 With no mandatory
inferences to be drawn, the court was free to decide that the LaDuke
activity constituted a mass seizure.'6
Placed in the context of these distinctions, the cases appear reconcil-
able while neither lends any significant support to the propositions
espoused by the other. Upon close inspection, however, the effect of these
distinctions may be weakened, leaving a standard applicable to the
workplace arena.
First, the distinctions propounded by the Ninth Circuit were likely not
drawn to suggest that the LaDuke holding had no application to a factory
raid. On the contrary, in order to perpetuate its views on protection of
fourth amendment guarantees in an immigration context and to avoid
being bound by the Delgado decision, the distinctions were made out of
necessity.165 Having had its decision in Delgado reversed, 166 the Ninth
Circuit was forced to carefully distinguish Delgado to prevent a repeat
occurrence.
Second, if viewed in light of why the distinction was drawn, the
argument that farm housing does not constitute the workplace 67 is
weakened. In distinguishing the two cases, the LaDuke court argued that
if the INS truly believed that the occupants of farm housing were living
at the workplace, they would be required, under Delgado, to seek consent
of the farm owner-not the worker-in order to protect the owner's
159 Exceptions to the warrant rule include exigent circumstances, searches incident to
arrest, and searches pursuant to voluntary consent. See 2 W. LAFAE, supra note 22 at
119-23.
160 See Note, supra note 9, at 1265.
161 FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment); CAL. Civ. PROc. CoIJ § 437c (West 1986).
162 While this decision may have been within the powers of the Court, this bears no
relationship to the correctness of such a decision.
163 LaDuke v. Nelson, 560 F. Supp. 158, 159 (E.D. Wash. 1982).
164 See Note, supra note 8, at 1266.
165 See supra notes 76-77 and notes 84-92 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit has
shown its willingness to afford protection in the immigration arena through its holdings in
Delgado and LaDuke.
166 International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir.
1982).
167 LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1328 (9th Cir. 1985).
1988]
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
rights. 168 Under the IRCA, however, farm owners face the same criminal
penalties as do factory owners if found to be employing illegal aliens.
Although not "on the job," illegal aliens found in the course of a farm
sweep will be admissible as evidence against the owner based on the
proximity of the housing to the workplace.169 Viewed in these terms, the
fact that farm housing is termed a "residence" by the court 70 has little,
if any, effect on the rights of the farm owner. The distinction drawn by the
court is based on the location of the worker at the time of the raid;' 71 a
distinction which is meaningless to the owner. Farm owners and factory
owners are functionally equivalent and as such, the same law should
apply to both. As Delgado fails to afford sufficient constitutional
protection,172 the law applied should be that of LaDuke.173
The LaDuke decision offers a standard ideally suited for application to
INS activity after enactment of the IRCA. More restrictive than Delgado,
LaDuke's emphasis on warrants, probable cause, and articulable suspi-
cion significantly curtails the ability of the INS, with its new criminal
law enforcement powers, to infringe upon fourth amendment rights. By
applying LaDuke to the workplace, the court will be able to protect the
now vulnerable rights of the business owner and avoid "the pitfall of
encroaching upon the civil rights of Hispanic citizens and legal aliens on
the basis of their physical or racial appearances, or their proximity to
suspected illegal aliens."174
In a practical application to the workplace, LaDuke requires the
following procedures. First, INS agents should obtain search or arrest
168 Id.
169 Farm housing is generally found immediately adjacent to where the work is being
done. Because of this custom, it is a general presumption that illegal aliens discovered in an
INS raid are employed at the workplace. 762 F.2d at 1326-28.
170 Id. at 1328.
171 A juxtaposition of the two cases illustrates that the LaDuke court is drawing the
distinction based on the location of the worker at the time of the raid. The key to this
distinction appears to be whether the workers were "on the job" at the time of the raid. In
LaDuke, the workers were not on the job, thus, rights were violated. In Delgado, workers
were on the job, thus no rights were violated. To the business owner in LaDuke, this
distinction has no meaning as he may still be sanctioned. The true benchmark is proximity
to the workplace, not location. There is also ample evidence to show that owners of both a
workplace and a residence maintain equivalent expectations of privacy. See supra notes
130-32 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 113-36 and accompanying text.
173 Of the three distinctions drawn by the court, the area searched carries the greatest
weight. If this distinction fails, then the warrant distinction must also fail as both searches
were based on articulable suspicion. (The Delgado warrant was established under the civil
administrative standard). The third distinction is purely procedural and adds no merit to
the substantive discussion. In light of the weakness of these three distinctions, it appears
likely that had LaDuke been decided after the IRCA, they would not have been needed. As
this would fly in the face of Delgado, the Supreme Court would be forced to rule on the issue.
174 Note, supra note 9, at 1269.
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warrants based on a criminal standard of probable cause. To meet this
standard, the INS will be required to show, by facts sufficient to convince
a neutral magistrate, that a particularly described illegal alien is
employed at that particular workplace.' 7 5 A simple recitation of ethnic
appearance or facts sufficient to meet the civil administrative standard
will not satisfy this burden.
Second, if, once inside the workplace, agents deem it necessary to take
action not permitted by the warrant, they should follow the guidelines for
warrantless seizures as developed in Terryl76 and its progeny. This
requires that any detention of a worker be based on either probable cause
or articulable suspicion that the worker is undocumented. 177 Although
warrantless activity was discouraged in LaDuke,178 the state's interest in
controlling immigration outweighs the infringement on individual rights
where these countervailing interests exist. In total, LaDuke is a proto-
typical standard for governing INS workplace activity after the IRCA.
V. CONCLUSION
The passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 has
greatly increased the powers of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. As business owners who employ illegal aliens now face criminal
sanctions, the INS has outgrown its civil administrative duties and
replaced them with those duties traditionally associated with criminal
law enforcement. The standards regulating INS behavior, however, have
failed to recognize this change, resulting in INS activity which violates
both the business owner's and the worker's constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures. To protect these rights, the
courts must reject the civil administrative warrant standard and require
the INS to meet a criminal standard of probable cause prior to the
issuance of a warrant. Once inside the workplace, INS agents must be
required to possess an articulable suspicion, above ethnic appearance,
that a worker is undocumented before that worker is detained. Only
through the implementation of such non-discriminatory procedures will
the rights of citizens and legal aliens be adequately protected.
STEVEN L. MILLER*
175 See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
' The reasonable suspicion standard should be applied. See supra notes 30-60 and
accompanying text.
177 LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1331 (9th Cir. 1985).
178 Id.
* Third year law student at Pepperdine University School of Law, Malibu, California.
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The Cleveland State Law Review dedicates this issue to the memory of
Forrest B. Weinberg, a Cleveland-Marshall College of Law faculty
member who died May 27, 1988 after a long struggle-with cancer. Forrest
Weinberg will be remembered as an outstanding lawyer and scholar. He
fulfilled a dream few are able to achieve when he left behind a successful
practice and became accepted as a scholar in academe.
Forrest Weinberg's journey to his dream began in 1946, when, after
serving for two years in the U.S. Navy, he entered the University of
Cincinnati Law School. The academic side of Forrest Weinberg thrived in
law school. He graduated first in his law school class. He was Editor-
in-Chief of Law Review and was Order of the Coif. In 1951, he went on to
earn his Master's degree in law from Harvard Law School.
Forrest Weinberg loved the law. Part of his love included the desire to
share its richness with others by teaching. Teaching was also an integral
part of his dream. Forrest Weinberg was admired and respected by his
students and colleagues alike. He brought to the classroom the practical-
ity of an experienced attorney and the exuberance that only one who
loves his field can lend to the learning experience. His thinking exem-
plified the traditional traits of skepticism and rigor, but he added a
special ability to think about the law in a dry-humored, practical and
open way.
The other part of Forrest Weinberg's dream was the practice of law. He
practiced with Hahn Loeser & Parks in Cleveland, Ohio for over 30 years.
He fought for his clients and for the system, especially by his work as
principal author of Ohio's Close Corporation Law.
Forrest Weinberg was a rare and inspiring individual. Although his life
was cut short by cancer, he realized his dream in a manner that touched
many lives. Forrest Weinberg will be missed by his colleagues, the legal
community and his students for the insight, challenge, and humor he
brought to the law. In this spirit, the Editors and Staff of the Cleveland
State Law Review dedicate this issue to his memory.
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